To me the most frightening thing about this situation is that in all the other conflicts you listed there were some competent people in leadership to ask the questions you are asking. Now there is absolutely nobody competent in the administration and they're led by a toddler who is a Russian asset. I don't see any good outcomes to this. I appreciate your in depth writing and your inside experience. Well worth the subscription price.
When we are relying on Iraq to be the cool calm collected, and just, one we're in trouble.
Especially since while the US can obliterate any city at will so can Russia and China and perhaps others. The US can obliterate more already obliterated cities because it has more weapons.... but the others only need enough to wipe out American cities once. They have enough for that don't them?
I fully agree that the US has by far the most powerful Air Force and the most powerful Navy in the world. Due to that, the US' ability to project power over the whole globe is unmatched in human history.
The US is also unmatched in short decicive wars fought in a shock an awe manner.
However, I am not sure how the US would fare in an high intensity attritional war against a technologically neer peer enemy where ground forces play a major role.
The scenario I have in mind is an all out war between the US and Israel against Iran where Russia ships all weapons available and not urgently needed for its own needs to Iran and also trains Irans forces.
How would you see this play out? Would a Vietnam scenario be probable?
The United States does not fight wars of attrition. We fight wars of movement—fast, hard, and devastatingly so. In military terms, we operate under the principle of violence of action—blind, cripple, kill. Against a peer adversary, the first wave isn’t a slow escalation; it’s an immediate, overwhelming strike that takes out command, control, infrastructure, and leadership before they even know what hit them.
People assume nuclear weapons are the ultimate hammer. They aren’t. The U.S. doesn’t need nukes to break a country. If ordered, we could launch a first-wave conventional strike that would punch out the lights of a near-peer before they ever get a shot off. Cyber, electronic warfare, and thousands of precision-guided munitions would erase their ability to function as a modern military within minutes.
The USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) alone could end Yemen if the order was given. Within an hour, every military installation would be leveled. Every power plant, airport, and key infrastructure—gone. Every political decision-maker? Either dead or in hiding. It wouldn’t even take nuclear weapons to make that happen. But if the order wasn’t just to cripple Yemen, but to end it? If the directive was to erase its ability to function as a nation? Those Gunslingers, Rampagers, Swordsmen, and Wildcats wouldn’t be launching Paveways. They’d be carrying B61 nuclear bombs—400 kilotons of instant sunburst.
That’s not speculation. While nuclear weapons are not standard deployment on U.S. carriers, if a President—especially one with no moral hesitation—gave the order, they would be loaded. And they would fly.
Think that’s unthinkable? It’s not. The U.S. seriously considered using a high-altitude nuclear EMP strike against Iraq in 1991 to fry their entire electrical and communications grid. The only reason it didn’t happen? The Joint Staff and the Justice Department concluded it was a disproportionate response that would alienate our allies. Not that it wouldn’t work—just that it wasn’t worth the political fallout.
You're worried about Iran/Russia. Forget that... I'll fight NATO... a true peer competitor.
If NATO or another near-peer engaged the U.S. in a full-scale war without using nuclear weapons, the first 24 hours would be an overwhelming display of force—missile salvos, cyber warfare, air dominance battles, and strategic destruction across command nodes, logistics hubs, and infrastructure. They might survive the first strike, but they wouldn’t recover fast enough to turn the tide. The U.S. outmatches NATO in airpower, naval dominance, and precision-strike capability. Every major European airbase, command center, and logistics hub would be hit before they could even mobilize a counterattack. Carrier groups and bomber forces would be unleashing hell on every strategic target before NATO forces even got out of their barracks.
That doesn’t mean it’s a one-sided fight. If a war against NATO dragged into a prolonged ground war, the outcome becomes less certain. They have industrial strength, manpower, and logistics to sustain a war longer than most realize. But in the opening hours? It’s not a contest. And let’s be honest—this administration has no moral hesitation. Trump has always favored overwhelming force. If he thinks ending a war in hours instead of months is an option, he’ll take it. The restraint we saw in 1991 wouldn’t apply.
People don’t understand what a simple flex from the U.S. military actually looks like. We don’t fight fair fights. We don’t engage in slow, grinding wars unless we’re politically forced to. Against a near-peer, the fight is more balanced—but in the opening minutes?
They still lose. And they lack the capability to recover. Which means that a war that starts conventional probably ends nuclear. And then? Well—"we all go together when we go."
Never in the history of human conflict has any nation possessed the power the United States does. NATO doesn’t have it. China doesn’t have it. Russia—even the Soviet Union—never had it. The Department of Defense is structured so that if the President says "Kick that guy in the head," in less than 15 minutes, someone is getting kicked in the head. Hard. Never to wake up.
The power of the U.S. war machine is something to behold—terrifyingly so. It’s why nobody even thinks about skinning that smokewagon. Because what happens?
They die.
We go unrestrained? We can deliver more firepower than all of World War II—including nuclear weapons—inside of 20 minutes.
Nobody walks away from that.
There will be no Vietnam.
That's why I was so resolute, "If our cause be just... let no one stand in our path."
But our cause has to be just... because someone is going to die. That part is assured. Our saber comes out... someone is going to die.
That is the first time I've ever read anyone express how overwhelming our capabilities are and I read a lot. Thanks for the enlightenment even if it does nothing to make me feel better about the situation. You would be an interesting guy to have a couple drinks with.
Thank You very much for your answer. I really apreciate that you took the time for it. I hope you can find time to anwer an additional question:
I fully agree that the US is the worlds best in winning wars in a decicive way and to avoid a attritional quagmire. But as far as I can tell, the other great powers (China as a real great power and Russia as something between a great power an a regional power) also know American strategy and capabilities and are highly likely to have ajusted. An alliance of both comes in my eyes closest to a peer enemy considering only countries, where an alliance is realistic .(I consider an alliance of both to be more powerful than Nato without the United States. If you see this diffently, I would like it very much to hear your reasoning, as you are way better informed than I am).
My question is concerning the following scenario: China mobilized somewhat, disperses its comand and control expecting an American strike and blockades Taiwan. They have the full backing of Russia with massively upgraded Rail logistics to deliver food, resources fuel and all available weaponry to China. Now just for theorys sake, lets assume that no Nukes will be used.
If I understand you correctly, the US could deliver all the firepower of World War 2 within 20 minutes without using nukes.
Would that mean, that in this scenario the US could destroy the Chinese forces, infrastructure and Industry in a way, that China would not be able to continue the war? (if China does continue the war it turn into a attritional war in my eyes)
Great question, and I appreciate the level of thought you’ve put into this.
The U.S. has historically excelled at decisive, high-intensity wars while avoiding long, drawn-out conflicts. But as you pointed out, China and Russia have studied U.S. strategy for decades, and any war against a near-peer (or a peer alliance) would play out very differently from Iraq or Serbia. If China moves on Taiwan with full Russian backing and we assume no nukes, the key factor becomes whether the U.S. can impose strategic paralysis on China fast enough to prevent a war of attrition. With normal leadership, this would be possible. With the Orange Orangutan, his sycophantic idiots, a DUI hire at the Pentagon, a Soviet stooge running DNI, and a whackadoo at the Agency… good fuckin’ luck.
The real question is whether U.S. firepower—equivalent to all of World War II in minutes—would be enough to break China’s warfighting capacity. I still think so, but with some caveats. First, China’s ability to sustain the fight must be crippled early. This means its navy, air force, infrastructure, and supply chains would have to take catastrophic losses fast. I think that's possible, but, if those objectives aren’t met, China has the mass and depth to absorb the first strike and turn the conflict into a prolonged war. Second, the U.S. has to prevent Russia from turning this into an extended, multi-front conflict.
Russia’s role here is often overstated. It could provide China with some critical resources—oil, gas, and food—but its ability to actually resupply China under wartime conditions is questionable at best. Russia is already struggling to sustain its own forces against Ukraine, a mid-sized European country, and its logistics infrastructure simply isn’t built for sustaining a distant ally in a large-scale war. Its military-industrial base is in shambles, and it's now dependent on North Korea and Iran for artillery shells and drones. That’s not a country ready to fuel China’s war machine. At best, Russia is a strategic distraction—forcing the U.S. to allocate resources to Europe—but it doesn’t meaningfully tip the balance in China’s favor; at least not in my immediate thinking.
China, meanwhile, faces massive supply chain vulnerabilities. It is a manufacturing powerhouse, but in wartime, it faces a fundamental problem: its economy is deeply reliant on global trade. It imports critical raw materials, microchips, energy, and advanced components to keep its industrial base running. If Europe, while not directly joining the war, simply refuses to trade with China, Beijing finds itself isolated. A long war would be extremely difficult for China to sustain if the U.S. and its allies effectively cut off its supply lines. Even if China seizes all Western manufacturing assets within its borders, that doesn’t change the fact that its military-industrial base relies on continuous outside inputs to function.
Japan and Australia wouldn’t sit this out either. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would force them to engage, and both have been steadily increasing their military capabilities in anticipation of exactly this scenario. Japan, in particular, has been shifting its doctrine toward countering China and would likely contribute significant air and naval forces. A U.S.-Japan-Australia coalition would make it extremely difficult for China to consolidate control over Taiwan, even if it successfully landed forces there.
Naval and air dominance would set the terms of this war, and that favors the U.S. China has no meaningful ability to project power beyond its near waters. If the U.S. wipes out its navy early, China has no viable path to sustain a war effort in Taiwan or beyond. U.S. submarines would devastate China’s shipping lanes, while air dominance would allow the U.S. to strike key targets deep inside the country. If the U.S. plays its hand correctly, China never even gets the chance to turn this into a war of attrition.
Europe may hate the U.S. under Trump, but it hates China and Russia more. While NATO wouldn’t formally join the fight, Europe wouldn’t lift a finger to help China either. That alone could be enough to push China’s economy into a wartime crisis, as it finds itself cut off from crucial trade partners. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has already forced Europe to rearm, and if Russia escalates, NATO would commit to containing it—tying down any potential Russian support for China.
If the U.S. moves quickly, it wins. If it hesitates or fights stupid, China drags it out—and that’s the real danger. The only real wildcard is leadership. With competent leadership, this war would be over in months. But with the Orangutan and his collection of bootlickers and lunatics calling the shots, the risk isn’t that the U.S. loses outright—it’s that it fumbles a winnable war into something far messier than it needs to be.
I think Sun Zu said, that it is very important to know yourself and your enemy. I think in the Russo Ukraine war, many western analysts correctly observed the Russians (they knew their enemy) but did not asses Ukraine correctly (they did not know themselves).
Considering the supplys and inteligence Ukraine received, I consider the Ukrainian Army (the Navi and the Air Force did not matter that much in my eyes, as the airspace was contested all the time and the job of both was to fire standoff weaponry/ Glide bombs without getting to close to enemy air defence systems or in striking range) to be the most formidable fighting force in Europe. Ukraine had access to top tier Nato Equipment for their ground forces, Intelligence provided by the United States, top tier European strike assets and Air denfence and second tier US strike assets and Air defence (no Tomahawks/ THAADS/AEGIS ashore). Additionally i belive that some of the Russian weapons (especially the hypersonics bit also its electronic warefare systems) are more sophisticated than the equivalent Western systems.
Therefore, the conclusion that the Ukraine war shows massive Russian weakness is wrong in my eyes. Do not take me wrong, in a conventional war between European Nato and Russia, I would bet all my money on Europe. But I think it would be a long and very bloody war of attrition where the much bigger population and way bigger industry leads to Europe prevailing.
In a war between Russia and the United States I do not see any realistic scenario where the US launches its WW2 in 20 min Firepower without Russia instantly using nukes to prevent a succesful first strike.
So although I know that the US is massively more powerful than Russia, I do not see a plausible scenario of a direct US Russian conflict without Armageddon.
Therefore I consider Russia to be one of the most powerful countries in the world (maybe place 3 far behind China or place 4 a little behind India). I think per GDP PPP Russia has the fourth laegest economy in the world.
As far as I can tell, you see this diffently. As you know much more about geopolitics than me, I would be happy if you can explain me why.
I agree that a direct conflict with Russia could go nuclear, but I don't see it as bad as you do—if the U.S. launched a full-scale first strike, likely, 97% (or more) of Russia’s nuclear forces would be wiped out before they could respond. The combination of ISR dominance, precision first-strike capability, and the real state of Russian readiness means that most of their strategic assets would never get a chance to launch. A few might survive—maybe a sub or a couple of mobile ICBMs—but even if a handful of warheads got through, it wouldn’t be enough to prevent Russia’s total annihilation. The U.S. missile defense system might not be perfect, but it wouldn’t need to be if only a handful of launches made it past the first strike. If we think Russia is going rogue, they're done. We will kick the ever-loving crap out of them, and we can do it. If necessary, we can take on both Russia and China at the same time. People don't appreciate the level of asymmetric warfare that can be brought to bear on an adversary. If the gloves are truly off, and we're going to try and stop WMD use, everyone is getting their asses kicked in short order. That doesn’t mean a two-front war would be easy or clean, but it does mean that the U.S. and its allies have the economic and military depth to outlast both.
Russia’s strategic forces, like its conventional military, likely suffer from the same issues—corruption, logistical failures, and readiness gaps. Many of its road-mobile ICBMs are trackable in real-time, its fixed silos are obvious targets, and while its SSBNs could pose a second-strike risk, U.S. hunter-killer subs have likely already accounted for most of them. Some deeply buried facilities might survive, but command and control would be in shambles before a meaningful response could be coordinated. Even in a worst-case scenario, Russia wouldn’t be able to strike with anything close to full force. The idea that they can wipe out the U.S. in a retaliatory strike is a Cold War fantasy, not a 21st-century reality.
And while Putin may be willing to take extreme risks, his generals know the reality. They understand that in a direct nuclear exchange with the U.S., Russia ceases to exist. Even if they get a couple of retaliatory strikes off, their entire country gets wiped out. Their best-case scenario is dying slightly later than everyone else. That’s why, even at their most aggressive, they rely on escalation threats without action—playing the nuclear card to intimidate rather than use it. The moment they go from posturing to an actual launch order, they know it's over.
That’s also why I don’t buy into the idea that the Ukraine war proves Russia is secretly stronger than it appears. Ukraine, with NATO backing, has exposed profound weaknesses in Russia’s military. The fact that Russia is struggling against a country that started with an economy the size of Texas and no real air force says everything. If this were a fight against the U.S. or NATO proper, the war wouldn’t be a long, grinding, attritional conflict—it would be a one-sided rout, with Russian forces collapsing under the weight of our industrial and technological superiority.
Russia is still a significant power, but it’s not in the same category as the U.S. or even China. It has nuclear leverage but cannot sustain a conventional fight against a peer adversary. It has regional influence but no real economic depth. Its military is large but riddled with inefficiencies and systemic corruption. China has more industrial capability and technological prowess, but even they rely on Western capital, resources, and markets to sustain their economy. Without those, they take a massive hit. They wouldn’t collapse overnight, but they would quickly lose the ability to sustain a prolonged war. China has been preparing for economic decoupling, securing energy and raw materials from outside the West, but they still depend on high-end Western technology to maintain a competitive edge. If the U.S. cuts them off from financial markets and critical components like advanced semiconductors, their military-industrial capacity grinds to a halt.
In short, guns may start wars, but economies finish them. To give you an idea, U.S. forces require, on average, about $10K per soldier per day in economic support. That’s bullets, guns, helmets, air cover, bases, tanks, fuel, MREs, everything. A 200,000-strong deployment costs two billion dollars a day. Monday… two billion. Tuesday… two billion. That’s why no one can match the U.S. in a prolonged war—the logistical and financial power behind the military is unparalleled. It’s not just about money; it’s about moving, supplying, and sustaining forces anywhere in the world, all the time, every time. U.S. troops may complain about MREs, but in Russia, it’s eating your dead comrades, their boots, and their hats because supply chains are a disaster. It’s not as bad as Stalingrad, where some soldiers went in with just a rifle or a single clip, but it’s still a fundamentally broken system that can’t sustain a modern war. I mean, come on, they called North Freaking Korea for help? That's like an alcoholic calling a drug addict for advice on how to get clean. Really?
This is why I rank Russia lower than you do. It remains a dangerous player, but it is more constrained than it appears—strong enough to deter direct attacks but incapable of sustained large-scale warfare against a serious opponent. In a conventional fight against NATO, it loses. In a nuclear fight against the U.S., it ceases to exist. And its ability to project power globally is minimal compared to that of the U.S. or China. That doesn’t mean Russia is irrelevant, but it does mean it’s not the global force many assume it to be—which is precisely why it leans so heavily on nuclear threats rather than actual military victories.
Thank you for being here and writing all that you do. I learn something important from you every time. And I very much admire your smart writing style and immense knowledge.
> So tell me again—who thought this was a good idea?
THE ANSWER IS CLEAR. AMERICA IS SOMEBODY’S ATTACK DOG.
Intel isn't *really* stupid; it doesn't *really* get things wrong. Anytime you hear that old chestnut, you need to understand that the "intel as bumbling fools" narrative is always cover for the real, unacknowledged reason behind some outrageous event.
Moreover, you don't really have to have a tinfoil hat in your closet to realize by now that American presidents don't make independent decisions, not even willful presidents with alpha patina. All presidents since who-knows-how-long-ago are quietly "advised" by men and women with allegiances higher up.
You said that the present outrageous attack was stupid and dangerous, that it doesn't make a shred of sense, that it rebels against sanity. What you didn't point out is that there *is* one state that WANTS WAR WITH IRAN. Indeed, I thought it was common knowledge that The State Formerly Known As Palestine has its sights set very much on eradicating Iran. Coincidentally, that is the same state whose leader every now and then visits our country, stands on the floor of our own Congress and Senate, and lectures our country's elected leaders while glaring at them threateningly.
At the top of the American hierarchy of power sits another one higher. This is your cui bono. This is how to make sense of American "idiocy."
Intel isn’t stupid. I agree with you there. People love the "intelligence failure" narrative because it’s easy, but the reality is more complicated. When something looks like a reckless miscalculation, it’s usually because someone calculated the risk and deemed it acceptable. Intelligence doesn’t get things wrong as often as it gets overridden, ignored, or boxed in by political objectives.
But let’s be precise about who is calling the shots. The idea that American presidents are mere puppets being "quietly advised" by some higher power is oversimplified. That’s not how power works. Do U.S. presidents operate within a web of advisors, intelligence agencies, financial elites, and foreign interests? Absolutely. Are they bound by political constraints and beholden to donors, lobbies, and strategic allies? Of course. But that’s not the same as being controlled.
As for Israel—yes, it has wanted a full-scale confrontation with Iran for decades. That’s not a secret. It lobbies for U.S. support, pushes for military action, and has conducted its operations against Iran, from Stuxnet to targeted assassinations. The Netanyahu government benefits from any escalation that pulls the U.S. deeper into confrontation with Iran. But does that mean Israel or any other foreign power sits at the top of the U.S. power structure? No.
U.S. policymakers have their agenda. Sometimes that agenda aligns with Israeli interests (crippling Iran, maintaining military dominance in the region). Sometimes it doesn’t (Biden pushing a temporary ceasefire, Obama’s nuclear deal, Trump pulling out of Syria over Netanyahu’s objections). The U.S. doesn’t blindly follow Israeli interests—it follows a broader doctrine of military and economic hegemony where chaos in the Middle East often serves its purposes.
So yes, I think it’s clear who benefits from escalation. But the idea that American idiocy always masks a hidden hand? Sometimes, the stupidity is real. Sometimes, as the saying goes, “never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.”
Some of your points are well taken. Thanks for the perspective. I’m not much of an insider.
It’s pretty clear that we won’t be convincing each other of much on the question of whether our leaders and presidents are controlled, the evidence for which, I believe, runs wide and deep and includes the fact that it’s the only way to make sense of the attack you spoke about on Iran. I’d like to believe it’s not true, and my mind will always be open to that possibility given new evidence, but for now …
Actually, an alternative explanation just occurred to me: In the same way that U.S aid to Ukraine was made contingent on Ukraine providing us with valuable mineral rights, maybe our provocation of war on behalf of Israel was also contingent on some form of practical payment. For example, was this attack (and no doubt our eventual participation in the war itself) the quid whose quo is taking possession of the Gaza strip for commercial exploitation?
Given how the President acts, I can't say absolutely not!
That said, I tend to think stupidity, versus malice, is more likely the explanation for all things government. There are endless bounds of stupidity in the federal government, and that's when you have competent leaders at the top.
Given the shitshow of morons in this cadre... I suspect incompetence is more at work than deliberative purposive action most of the time.
> Given how the President acts, I can't say absolutely not!
I hear you! Though I suspect we could find worrisome back-room-ish behavior on the part of every president one might name, at least since a certain time in the distant past.
"Don't attribute to malice what can be explained by stupidity." I've heard that expression many times over the years, and my ealier self would definitely have accepted this, but over time I've seen through too many instances of camouflaged ends and intentional evil to give the big boys this easy out. I think it's safer to assume the opposite, at least until all evidence has been reasonably considered. Otherwise, we'd never question anything that wasn't obvious, and the big boys are too powerful to be too obvious about much of anything.
I do acknowledge the general truth, however that the "you-can't-fire-them" class of lower-level government employees have an especially strong incentive toward stupidity, laziness, incompetence, and -- worst of all -- contempt for the American citizen. (Noble exceptions to this abound, of course, but I'm speaking of the bureaucracy as a whole ...)
The larger world is so hopeless and helpless that I stopped watching television and listening to radio years ago. For the most part, when I hear of something big happening, it's only by accident, and I've got to say, life has been better this way. Try it for a few weeks or months and then go back to commercial media just to remind yourself what it was like. Never will I go back to the circus.
Thanks for the lengthy and considered response to what on reflection is all over the place indeed. The result of not thinking things through, I guess. In my defence I am not making an ideological point about the current administration, merely pointing to the disruptive and destructive nature of its policy posture re NATO: perhaps it's all for the best, Europe must awaken, and Trump's egregious style has jolted NATO into seeing that. I appreciate your points and see the awful truth of overwhelming military power. But only in the hands of those with restraint at the heart of their engagement with others. I'm properly concerned at the appointment of Hegseth as Secretary of Defense but my opinion matters not a jot. You draw the correct conclusions about Gulf War I and failed attempts at overreach in other places. I am embarrassed to see that my note was indeed not thought through but rather portentously written - unlike your own original post and your reply to mine.
I've been thinking about this piece for the last 24 hours and have another question for you. How do we fight guerrillas such we encountered in Afghanistan? In all my reading of military encounters local guerrilla fighters are the hardest enemy to defeat. They know the area and terrain, they swoop in for a sudden attack and vanish. Russia learned this in Afghanistan and the US wasn't smart enough in my opinion to learn from their mistakes. Short of dropping a nuke and obliterating everything how do we deal with this successfully? The Houthis seem to have the possibility of being Afghanistan 2.0.
First, let me say my forte is policy analysis, not military strategy. I'm not the strategy guy in the room (when I was in the room), but I’ve worked on military field manuals, OPLANS, etc., so it’s not like I don’t understand this. Based on what we’ve seen work, the best approach would be “denial of oxygen.”
The Houthis don’t just survive on firepower; they need a steady flow of resources, legitimacy, and external support to keep fighting. Instead of trying to root them out with an occupation or large-scale bombing campaign, the smarter play is to suffocate them strategically—cutting off their ability to sustain prolonged conflict without giving them the propaganda win of looking like the underdog against U.S. firepower. It’s not easy, but that’s the recommendation I’d make. It’s also what I imagine a competent Joint Staff would propose. With Dan Cain as Chairman and the DUI Hire in place, I suspect the actual strategy will involve dropping MAGA hats on Yemen and calling it a day, or alternatively, indiscriminate carpet bombing. Both would fail.
The Houthis rely on Iranian weapons, tech, and intelligence. Rather than direct confrontation, the goal should be to disrupt that pipeline. Interdict arms shipments, hit logistics hubs, and increase the cost of Iranian support. If sustaining the Houthis becomes too expensive or logistically difficult, Tehran has to reconsider how much it’s worth. Guerrilla movements don’t just win battles—they win narratives. Right now, they position themselves as the resistance against Saudi and U.S. intervention, which keeps them politically viable. Undermining that means exploiting their governance failures, amplifying internal divisions, and avoiding broad strikes that turn civilian casualties into recruitment tools.
I would think that the successful military approach would focus on surgical strikes over broad campaigns. Again, this is what we did during ISIS. We weren't rolling out the B2s and carpet bombing, we hit where it hurt most and disrupted supplies and recruiting capability. Mass bombing doesn’t eliminate insurgencies—it reinforces them. The priority should be decapitation strikes on leadership, electronic and cyber disruptions to limit their coordination, and selective infrastructure targeting to disrupt warfighting capabilities. The goal isn’t wiping them out overnight—it’s making their position untenable over time. Cut off their supply lines, force them into a defensive posture, and make continued fighting too costly. Eventually Iran has to decide if it wants to cut and run or bleed out. Most of the time, they're going to choose cut and run. That leaves the Houthis to decide if they want to remain a cogent organization or cease to exist. I'm guessing suicide isn't their top priority.
This is the same kind of long-term containment strategy that eventually worked against ISIS. ISIS was not outright eliminated, but we degraded it into an incoherent force that could project power. Overwhelming force doesn’t defeat these groups; it degrades them, forces them into smaller, ineffective operations, and allows them to erode or be dismantled piece by piece. The difference here is that the Houthis have state backing, which makes it a tougher problem, but the principle remains the same. One additional pressure point is Iran itself—if they’re forced to divert resources elsewhere, it makes supporting the Houthis harder. Disrupting Iranian infrastructure, cyber capabilities, and economic stability in targeted ways would add pressure, forcing them to reconsider the cost of proxy warfare.
The mistake would be going all-in and escalating into a broader war. The more the U.S. leans into conventional force, the more the Houthis gain politically by playing the underdog. The right move is sustained strategic pressure in ways they can’t easily counter—strangling their ability to function rather than charging into the kind of fight they want.
Again, I'm not the J5... but that's my eyeballed plan. I imagine it's the right one given what I know about how to defeat insurgencies and proxy organizations.
Powerful and forceful writing, if confusing in its boastfulness. Cometh the man (Trump), cometh the retribution - but against the US, because of HIS boastfulness. You haven't drawn the correct conclusions from Vietnam onwards. Gulf War I looks anomalous today, the result misleading you into self-reliant complacency when the proper reading should have valued the allied coalition. This is what happens when an unserious electorate delivers the reins of government up to Reality TV showmen. At best, your former allies are wakening to your threat and taking steps to block you. At worst, the constellation of evil actors now includes the US. God help us all.
I’ll be honest—I’m not sure I understand what you’re arguing because your comment is all over the place. If your point is that the U.S. has become reckless in its use of military force, that’s one discussion. If it’s that the U.S. is overestimating its power and ignoring the role of allies, that’s another. If it’s that Trump’s foreign policy posturing is coming back to bite us, that’s yet another. Right now, you seem to be blending all of them without a clear throughline.
This wasn’t about boastfulness or blind faith in American power—it was about practical containment strategies that avoid deeper entanglements. The goal isn’t to wage endless wars or act unilaterally, it’s to prevent conflicts from escalating into exactly the kind of quagmires you’re warning about. Gulf War I wasn’t an anomaly because of the coalition—it was successful because it had clear objectives, overwhelming force, and a limited scope. The problem in later wars wasn’t that we lacked allies, it was that we overestimated our ability to nation-build after military victories. That’s not a lesson that invalidates U.S. power projection—it’s a lesson about what comes after military success.
If your concern is that U.S. allies are adjusting to a world where they trust Washington less, that’s a fair discussion. But if your argument is that the U.S. has now become one of the “evil actors,” that’s an entirely different debate—one that’s more about ideology than strategy. If anything, the greater risk isn’t American overreach, it’s American disengagement. As flawed as U.S. foreign policy has been, a world without a strong deterrent to hostile actors isn’t a world that gets more stable.
That would be an adversaries choice of resistance, I think. We don't seem to respond as well. See Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.
What concerns me now is Iran quietly finding ways to get a few nukes. I don't think they'd hold back of their existence was threatened. Can you imagine the shock and response if they got lucky and hit a carrier group? Unlikely, yes. But warfare is full of unlikely events.
It’s true that the U.S. has struggled against asymmetric resistance in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam—but that’s not because we’re incapable of winning those wars. It’s because we don’t fight total wars anymore.
The response would look very different against a near-peer adversary. The U.S. doesn’t lose conventional fights—we lose when we fight with political constraints and try to wage war while pretending it’s a humanitarian mission. If the gloves come off, and the mission is destruction rather than occupation, the outcome changes fast.
As for Iran, quietly obtaining nukes is always a concern. But let’s be realistic—if they get a small arsenal, they don’t use it unless they face total annihilation. Iran’s leadership isn’t suicidal; they’re strategic. They want nuclear weapons for deterrence, not first strikes.
Could they get lucky and hit a carrier group? It's unlikely, but yes—warfare is full of improbable events. That’s why we overwhelm threats before they become problems. But if Iran ever nuked a carrier group? Their country ceases to exist within the hour. And they know it.
So, while it’s worth watching, it’s not the most immediate concern. The bigger issue isn’t Iran using a nuke—it’s how their nuclear capability changes the regional power balance and emboldens them to take enormous risks elsewhere.
Hypothetical question: Would we want to wage total war against Canada? Why?
As far as Iran goes, if we went all out against them, would they accept being destroyed without total retaliation? They're religious fanatics, after all.
A total war against Canada is an absurd hypothetical precisely because Canada poses no existential threat to the United States. The Houthis, for all their hostility, are not an existential threat either—they're a regional insurgency with drones and missiles, not a peer adversary.
As for Iran, "going all out" assumes they wouldn't respond in kind. Iran has spent decades building asymmetric capabilities—proxy networks, cyber warfare, and regional influence—to ensure that any attack on them comes at a steep cost. The assumption that religious fanaticism means suicidal self-destruction ignores Iran’s long history of calculated, strategic decision-making. They might retaliate in ways that make an all-out war far costlier than anyone expects.
In the end, however, they still lose. They can't make it so costly that the US decides not to end them if the decision is made to "end them."
You may be 100% correct about Iran being religious fanatics, but I think it wouldn't hurt if we tried to double-check that assumption. Many nations, including ours, create and spread subtle propaganda on such a regular and ongoing basis that we can't tell it apart from real truth.
The few Persians I've known were highly intelligent, competent, and civilized people who cared about their families just like we do, and other than those few, I've never met any actual inhabitants of the country of Iran or seen what life is like over there -- other than the claims made by the same media that has lied to the world on myriad other topics.
There is also that special category of falsehood called atrocity propaganda, one of whose most common claims has been that the enemy "is killing babies." Remember the baby incubators lie which was sold to Congress using the actual tears of a real "eyewitness"? Remember an old wartime poster circa WWI that showed a monstrous German Hun eating a baby? Etc.
I'm suggesting, in effect, that we run surprise inspections of the statements made by media and government to make sure they're not exploiting our trust to justify wars whose real goals are turf, oil, money, drugs, or favors for scary friends.
Yes I remember all of that... the incubator story... etc. Weepy Kuwatiis.
I also remember George Tenant and Colin Powell talking about chemical weapons trucks. Intelligence is not fact.
Sure, skepticism about media narratives is healthy, but at the end of the day, it doesn’t change the outcome. Iran can build proxy networks, run cyber ops, and play the long game all they want—but spin the wheel, go to war, and get crushed. It doesn’t matter how many brilliant Persians exist or how strategic their leadership is. If they take on the U.S. in a full-scale fight, they lose. They operate the real way they do because they know this. That’s why they rely on asymmetric tactics, regional influence, and economic leverage instead of picking a direct fight.
It’s not about propaganda—it’s about reality. The reality is, they get their asses handed to them faster than a sandwich from Jimmy Johns.
To me the most frightening thing about this situation is that in all the other conflicts you listed there were some competent people in leadership to ask the questions you are asking. Now there is absolutely nobody competent in the administration and they're led by a toddler who is a Russian asset. I don't see any good outcomes to this. I appreciate your in depth writing and your inside experience. Well worth the subscription price.
I do believe we are. It's just that a lot of the people don't even know about it yet. Undetectable early stage, just like cancer
BTW, I'm not talking about your article, I'm talking about what could possibly happen on US soil.
When we are relying on Iraq to be the cool calm collected, and just, one we're in trouble.
Especially since while the US can obliterate any city at will so can Russia and China and perhaps others. The US can obliterate more already obliterated cities because it has more weapons.... but the others only need enough to wipe out American cities once. They have enough for that don't them?
I fully agree that the US has by far the most powerful Air Force and the most powerful Navy in the world. Due to that, the US' ability to project power over the whole globe is unmatched in human history.
The US is also unmatched in short decicive wars fought in a shock an awe manner.
However, I am not sure how the US would fare in an high intensity attritional war against a technologically neer peer enemy where ground forces play a major role.
The scenario I have in mind is an all out war between the US and Israel against Iran where Russia ships all weapons available and not urgently needed for its own needs to Iran and also trains Irans forces.
How would you see this play out? Would a Vietnam scenario be probable?
The United States does not fight wars of attrition. We fight wars of movement—fast, hard, and devastatingly so. In military terms, we operate under the principle of violence of action—blind, cripple, kill. Against a peer adversary, the first wave isn’t a slow escalation; it’s an immediate, overwhelming strike that takes out command, control, infrastructure, and leadership before they even know what hit them.
People assume nuclear weapons are the ultimate hammer. They aren’t. The U.S. doesn’t need nukes to break a country. If ordered, we could launch a first-wave conventional strike that would punch out the lights of a near-peer before they ever get a shot off. Cyber, electronic warfare, and thousands of precision-guided munitions would erase their ability to function as a modern military within minutes.
The USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) alone could end Yemen if the order was given. Within an hour, every military installation would be leveled. Every power plant, airport, and key infrastructure—gone. Every political decision-maker? Either dead or in hiding. It wouldn’t even take nuclear weapons to make that happen. But if the order wasn’t just to cripple Yemen, but to end it? If the directive was to erase its ability to function as a nation? Those Gunslingers, Rampagers, Swordsmen, and Wildcats wouldn’t be launching Paveways. They’d be carrying B61 nuclear bombs—400 kilotons of instant sunburst.
That’s not speculation. While nuclear weapons are not standard deployment on U.S. carriers, if a President—especially one with no moral hesitation—gave the order, they would be loaded. And they would fly.
Think that’s unthinkable? It’s not. The U.S. seriously considered using a high-altitude nuclear EMP strike against Iraq in 1991 to fry their entire electrical and communications grid. The only reason it didn’t happen? The Joint Staff and the Justice Department concluded it was a disproportionate response that would alienate our allies. Not that it wouldn’t work—just that it wasn’t worth the political fallout.
You're worried about Iran/Russia. Forget that... I'll fight NATO... a true peer competitor.
If NATO or another near-peer engaged the U.S. in a full-scale war without using nuclear weapons, the first 24 hours would be an overwhelming display of force—missile salvos, cyber warfare, air dominance battles, and strategic destruction across command nodes, logistics hubs, and infrastructure. They might survive the first strike, but they wouldn’t recover fast enough to turn the tide. The U.S. outmatches NATO in airpower, naval dominance, and precision-strike capability. Every major European airbase, command center, and logistics hub would be hit before they could even mobilize a counterattack. Carrier groups and bomber forces would be unleashing hell on every strategic target before NATO forces even got out of their barracks.
That doesn’t mean it’s a one-sided fight. If a war against NATO dragged into a prolonged ground war, the outcome becomes less certain. They have industrial strength, manpower, and logistics to sustain a war longer than most realize. But in the opening hours? It’s not a contest. And let’s be honest—this administration has no moral hesitation. Trump has always favored overwhelming force. If he thinks ending a war in hours instead of months is an option, he’ll take it. The restraint we saw in 1991 wouldn’t apply.
People don’t understand what a simple flex from the U.S. military actually looks like. We don’t fight fair fights. We don’t engage in slow, grinding wars unless we’re politically forced to. Against a near-peer, the fight is more balanced—but in the opening minutes?
They still lose. And they lack the capability to recover. Which means that a war that starts conventional probably ends nuclear. And then? Well—"we all go together when we go."
Never in the history of human conflict has any nation possessed the power the United States does. NATO doesn’t have it. China doesn’t have it. Russia—even the Soviet Union—never had it. The Department of Defense is structured so that if the President says "Kick that guy in the head," in less than 15 minutes, someone is getting kicked in the head. Hard. Never to wake up.
The power of the U.S. war machine is something to behold—terrifyingly so. It’s why nobody even thinks about skinning that smokewagon. Because what happens?
They die.
We go unrestrained? We can deliver more firepower than all of World War II—including nuclear weapons—inside of 20 minutes.
Nobody walks away from that.
There will be no Vietnam.
That's why I was so resolute, "If our cause be just... let no one stand in our path."
But our cause has to be just... because someone is going to die. That part is assured. Our saber comes out... someone is going to die.
That is the first time I've ever read anyone express how overwhelming our capabilities are and I read a lot. Thanks for the enlightenment even if it does nothing to make me feel better about the situation. You would be an interesting guy to have a couple drinks with.
Happy to buy the first round. :)
Thank You very much for your answer. I really apreciate that you took the time for it. I hope you can find time to anwer an additional question:
I fully agree that the US is the worlds best in winning wars in a decicive way and to avoid a attritional quagmire. But as far as I can tell, the other great powers (China as a real great power and Russia as something between a great power an a regional power) also know American strategy and capabilities and are highly likely to have ajusted. An alliance of both comes in my eyes closest to a peer enemy considering only countries, where an alliance is realistic .(I consider an alliance of both to be more powerful than Nato without the United States. If you see this diffently, I would like it very much to hear your reasoning, as you are way better informed than I am).
My question is concerning the following scenario: China mobilized somewhat, disperses its comand and control expecting an American strike and blockades Taiwan. They have the full backing of Russia with massively upgraded Rail logistics to deliver food, resources fuel and all available weaponry to China. Now just for theorys sake, lets assume that no Nukes will be used.
If I understand you correctly, the US could deliver all the firepower of World War 2 within 20 minutes without using nukes.
Would that mean, that in this scenario the US could destroy the Chinese forces, infrastructure and Industry in a way, that China would not be able to continue the war? (if China does continue the war it turn into a attritional war in my eyes)
Great question, and I appreciate the level of thought you’ve put into this.
The U.S. has historically excelled at decisive, high-intensity wars while avoiding long, drawn-out conflicts. But as you pointed out, China and Russia have studied U.S. strategy for decades, and any war against a near-peer (or a peer alliance) would play out very differently from Iraq or Serbia. If China moves on Taiwan with full Russian backing and we assume no nukes, the key factor becomes whether the U.S. can impose strategic paralysis on China fast enough to prevent a war of attrition. With normal leadership, this would be possible. With the Orange Orangutan, his sycophantic idiots, a DUI hire at the Pentagon, a Soviet stooge running DNI, and a whackadoo at the Agency… good fuckin’ luck.
The real question is whether U.S. firepower—equivalent to all of World War II in minutes—would be enough to break China’s warfighting capacity. I still think so, but with some caveats. First, China’s ability to sustain the fight must be crippled early. This means its navy, air force, infrastructure, and supply chains would have to take catastrophic losses fast. I think that's possible, but, if those objectives aren’t met, China has the mass and depth to absorb the first strike and turn the conflict into a prolonged war. Second, the U.S. has to prevent Russia from turning this into an extended, multi-front conflict.
Russia’s role here is often overstated. It could provide China with some critical resources—oil, gas, and food—but its ability to actually resupply China under wartime conditions is questionable at best. Russia is already struggling to sustain its own forces against Ukraine, a mid-sized European country, and its logistics infrastructure simply isn’t built for sustaining a distant ally in a large-scale war. Its military-industrial base is in shambles, and it's now dependent on North Korea and Iran for artillery shells and drones. That’s not a country ready to fuel China’s war machine. At best, Russia is a strategic distraction—forcing the U.S. to allocate resources to Europe—but it doesn’t meaningfully tip the balance in China’s favor; at least not in my immediate thinking.
China, meanwhile, faces massive supply chain vulnerabilities. It is a manufacturing powerhouse, but in wartime, it faces a fundamental problem: its economy is deeply reliant on global trade. It imports critical raw materials, microchips, energy, and advanced components to keep its industrial base running. If Europe, while not directly joining the war, simply refuses to trade with China, Beijing finds itself isolated. A long war would be extremely difficult for China to sustain if the U.S. and its allies effectively cut off its supply lines. Even if China seizes all Western manufacturing assets within its borders, that doesn’t change the fact that its military-industrial base relies on continuous outside inputs to function.
Japan and Australia wouldn’t sit this out either. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would force them to engage, and both have been steadily increasing their military capabilities in anticipation of exactly this scenario. Japan, in particular, has been shifting its doctrine toward countering China and would likely contribute significant air and naval forces. A U.S.-Japan-Australia coalition would make it extremely difficult for China to consolidate control over Taiwan, even if it successfully landed forces there.
Naval and air dominance would set the terms of this war, and that favors the U.S. China has no meaningful ability to project power beyond its near waters. If the U.S. wipes out its navy early, China has no viable path to sustain a war effort in Taiwan or beyond. U.S. submarines would devastate China’s shipping lanes, while air dominance would allow the U.S. to strike key targets deep inside the country. If the U.S. plays its hand correctly, China never even gets the chance to turn this into a war of attrition.
Europe may hate the U.S. under Trump, but it hates China and Russia more. While NATO wouldn’t formally join the fight, Europe wouldn’t lift a finger to help China either. That alone could be enough to push China’s economy into a wartime crisis, as it finds itself cut off from crucial trade partners. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has already forced Europe to rearm, and if Russia escalates, NATO would commit to containing it—tying down any potential Russian support for China.
If the U.S. moves quickly, it wins. If it hesitates or fights stupid, China drags it out—and that’s the real danger. The only real wildcard is leadership. With competent leadership, this war would be over in months. But with the Orangutan and his collection of bootlickers and lunatics calling the shots, the risk isn’t that the U.S. loses outright—it’s that it fumbles a winnable war into something far messier than it needs to be.
Thank You very much again for your answer.
I hope you have time for another question.
I think Sun Zu said, that it is very important to know yourself and your enemy. I think in the Russo Ukraine war, many western analysts correctly observed the Russians (they knew their enemy) but did not asses Ukraine correctly (they did not know themselves).
Considering the supplys and inteligence Ukraine received, I consider the Ukrainian Army (the Navi and the Air Force did not matter that much in my eyes, as the airspace was contested all the time and the job of both was to fire standoff weaponry/ Glide bombs without getting to close to enemy air defence systems or in striking range) to be the most formidable fighting force in Europe. Ukraine had access to top tier Nato Equipment for their ground forces, Intelligence provided by the United States, top tier European strike assets and Air denfence and second tier US strike assets and Air defence (no Tomahawks/ THAADS/AEGIS ashore). Additionally i belive that some of the Russian weapons (especially the hypersonics bit also its electronic warefare systems) are more sophisticated than the equivalent Western systems.
Therefore, the conclusion that the Ukraine war shows massive Russian weakness is wrong in my eyes. Do not take me wrong, in a conventional war between European Nato and Russia, I would bet all my money on Europe. But I think it would be a long and very bloody war of attrition where the much bigger population and way bigger industry leads to Europe prevailing.
In a war between Russia and the United States I do not see any realistic scenario where the US launches its WW2 in 20 min Firepower without Russia instantly using nukes to prevent a succesful first strike.
So although I know that the US is massively more powerful than Russia, I do not see a plausible scenario of a direct US Russian conflict without Armageddon.
Therefore I consider Russia to be one of the most powerful countries in the world (maybe place 3 far behind China or place 4 a little behind India). I think per GDP PPP Russia has the fourth laegest economy in the world.
As far as I can tell, you see this diffently. As you know much more about geopolitics than me, I would be happy if you can explain me why.
I agree that a direct conflict with Russia could go nuclear, but I don't see it as bad as you do—if the U.S. launched a full-scale first strike, likely, 97% (or more) of Russia’s nuclear forces would be wiped out before they could respond. The combination of ISR dominance, precision first-strike capability, and the real state of Russian readiness means that most of their strategic assets would never get a chance to launch. A few might survive—maybe a sub or a couple of mobile ICBMs—but even if a handful of warheads got through, it wouldn’t be enough to prevent Russia’s total annihilation. The U.S. missile defense system might not be perfect, but it wouldn’t need to be if only a handful of launches made it past the first strike. If we think Russia is going rogue, they're done. We will kick the ever-loving crap out of them, and we can do it. If necessary, we can take on both Russia and China at the same time. People don't appreciate the level of asymmetric warfare that can be brought to bear on an adversary. If the gloves are truly off, and we're going to try and stop WMD use, everyone is getting their asses kicked in short order. That doesn’t mean a two-front war would be easy or clean, but it does mean that the U.S. and its allies have the economic and military depth to outlast both.
Russia’s strategic forces, like its conventional military, likely suffer from the same issues—corruption, logistical failures, and readiness gaps. Many of its road-mobile ICBMs are trackable in real-time, its fixed silos are obvious targets, and while its SSBNs could pose a second-strike risk, U.S. hunter-killer subs have likely already accounted for most of them. Some deeply buried facilities might survive, but command and control would be in shambles before a meaningful response could be coordinated. Even in a worst-case scenario, Russia wouldn’t be able to strike with anything close to full force. The idea that they can wipe out the U.S. in a retaliatory strike is a Cold War fantasy, not a 21st-century reality.
And while Putin may be willing to take extreme risks, his generals know the reality. They understand that in a direct nuclear exchange with the U.S., Russia ceases to exist. Even if they get a couple of retaliatory strikes off, their entire country gets wiped out. Their best-case scenario is dying slightly later than everyone else. That’s why, even at their most aggressive, they rely on escalation threats without action—playing the nuclear card to intimidate rather than use it. The moment they go from posturing to an actual launch order, they know it's over.
That’s also why I don’t buy into the idea that the Ukraine war proves Russia is secretly stronger than it appears. Ukraine, with NATO backing, has exposed profound weaknesses in Russia’s military. The fact that Russia is struggling against a country that started with an economy the size of Texas and no real air force says everything. If this were a fight against the U.S. or NATO proper, the war wouldn’t be a long, grinding, attritional conflict—it would be a one-sided rout, with Russian forces collapsing under the weight of our industrial and technological superiority.
Russia is still a significant power, but it’s not in the same category as the U.S. or even China. It has nuclear leverage but cannot sustain a conventional fight against a peer adversary. It has regional influence but no real economic depth. Its military is large but riddled with inefficiencies and systemic corruption. China has more industrial capability and technological prowess, but even they rely on Western capital, resources, and markets to sustain their economy. Without those, they take a massive hit. They wouldn’t collapse overnight, but they would quickly lose the ability to sustain a prolonged war. China has been preparing for economic decoupling, securing energy and raw materials from outside the West, but they still depend on high-end Western technology to maintain a competitive edge. If the U.S. cuts them off from financial markets and critical components like advanced semiconductors, their military-industrial capacity grinds to a halt.
In short, guns may start wars, but economies finish them. To give you an idea, U.S. forces require, on average, about $10K per soldier per day in economic support. That’s bullets, guns, helmets, air cover, bases, tanks, fuel, MREs, everything. A 200,000-strong deployment costs two billion dollars a day. Monday… two billion. Tuesday… two billion. That’s why no one can match the U.S. in a prolonged war—the logistical and financial power behind the military is unparalleled. It’s not just about money; it’s about moving, supplying, and sustaining forces anywhere in the world, all the time, every time. U.S. troops may complain about MREs, but in Russia, it’s eating your dead comrades, their boots, and their hats because supply chains are a disaster. It’s not as bad as Stalingrad, where some soldiers went in with just a rifle or a single clip, but it’s still a fundamentally broken system that can’t sustain a modern war. I mean, come on, they called North Freaking Korea for help? That's like an alcoholic calling a drug addict for advice on how to get clean. Really?
This is why I rank Russia lower than you do. It remains a dangerous player, but it is more constrained than it appears—strong enough to deter direct attacks but incapable of sustained large-scale warfare against a serious opponent. In a conventional fight against NATO, it loses. In a nuclear fight against the U.S., it ceases to exist. And its ability to project power globally is minimal compared to that of the U.S. or China. That doesn’t mean Russia is irrelevant, but it does mean it’s not the global force many assume it to be—which is precisely why it leans so heavily on nuclear threats rather than actual military victories.
Thank you for being here and writing all that you do. I learn something important from you every time. And I very much admire your smart writing style and immense knowledge.
> So tell me again—who thought this was a good idea?
THE ANSWER IS CLEAR. AMERICA IS SOMEBODY’S ATTACK DOG.
Intel isn't *really* stupid; it doesn't *really* get things wrong. Anytime you hear that old chestnut, you need to understand that the "intel as bumbling fools" narrative is always cover for the real, unacknowledged reason behind some outrageous event.
Moreover, you don't really have to have a tinfoil hat in your closet to realize by now that American presidents don't make independent decisions, not even willful presidents with alpha patina. All presidents since who-knows-how-long-ago are quietly "advised" by men and women with allegiances higher up.
You said that the present outrageous attack was stupid and dangerous, that it doesn't make a shred of sense, that it rebels against sanity. What you didn't point out is that there *is* one state that WANTS WAR WITH IRAN. Indeed, I thought it was common knowledge that The State Formerly Known As Palestine has its sights set very much on eradicating Iran. Coincidentally, that is the same state whose leader every now and then visits our country, stands on the floor of our own Congress and Senate, and lectures our country's elected leaders while glaring at them threateningly.
At the top of the American hierarchy of power sits another one higher. This is your cui bono. This is how to make sense of American "idiocy."
Thanks for reading... and thinking...
Intel isn’t stupid. I agree with you there. People love the "intelligence failure" narrative because it’s easy, but the reality is more complicated. When something looks like a reckless miscalculation, it’s usually because someone calculated the risk and deemed it acceptable. Intelligence doesn’t get things wrong as often as it gets overridden, ignored, or boxed in by political objectives.
But let’s be precise about who is calling the shots. The idea that American presidents are mere puppets being "quietly advised" by some higher power is oversimplified. That’s not how power works. Do U.S. presidents operate within a web of advisors, intelligence agencies, financial elites, and foreign interests? Absolutely. Are they bound by political constraints and beholden to donors, lobbies, and strategic allies? Of course. But that’s not the same as being controlled.
As for Israel—yes, it has wanted a full-scale confrontation with Iran for decades. That’s not a secret. It lobbies for U.S. support, pushes for military action, and has conducted its operations against Iran, from Stuxnet to targeted assassinations. The Netanyahu government benefits from any escalation that pulls the U.S. deeper into confrontation with Iran. But does that mean Israel or any other foreign power sits at the top of the U.S. power structure? No.
U.S. policymakers have their agenda. Sometimes that agenda aligns with Israeli interests (crippling Iran, maintaining military dominance in the region). Sometimes it doesn’t (Biden pushing a temporary ceasefire, Obama’s nuclear deal, Trump pulling out of Syria over Netanyahu’s objections). The U.S. doesn’t blindly follow Israeli interests—it follows a broader doctrine of military and economic hegemony where chaos in the Middle East often serves its purposes.
So yes, I think it’s clear who benefits from escalation. But the idea that American idiocy always masks a hidden hand? Sometimes, the stupidity is real. Sometimes, as the saying goes, “never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.”
Thoughts?
Some of your points are well taken. Thanks for the perspective. I’m not much of an insider.
It’s pretty clear that we won’t be convincing each other of much on the question of whether our leaders and presidents are controlled, the evidence for which, I believe, runs wide and deep and includes the fact that it’s the only way to make sense of the attack you spoke about on Iran. I’d like to believe it’s not true, and my mind will always be open to that possibility given new evidence, but for now …
Actually, an alternative explanation just occurred to me: In the same way that U.S aid to Ukraine was made contingent on Ukraine providing us with valuable mineral rights, maybe our provocation of war on behalf of Israel was also contingent on some form of practical payment. For example, was this attack (and no doubt our eventual participation in the war itself) the quid whose quo is taking possession of the Gaza strip for commercial exploitation?
Given how the President acts, I can't say absolutely not!
That said, I tend to think stupidity, versus malice, is more likely the explanation for all things government. There are endless bounds of stupidity in the federal government, and that's when you have competent leaders at the top.
Given the shitshow of morons in this cadre... I suspect incompetence is more at work than deliberative purposive action most of the time.
> Given how the President acts, I can't say absolutely not!
I hear you! Though I suspect we could find worrisome back-room-ish behavior on the part of every president one might name, at least since a certain time in the distant past.
"Don't attribute to malice what can be explained by stupidity." I've heard that expression many times over the years, and my ealier self would definitely have accepted this, but over time I've seen through too many instances of camouflaged ends and intentional evil to give the big boys this easy out. I think it's safer to assume the opposite, at least until all evidence has been reasonably considered. Otherwise, we'd never question anything that wasn't obvious, and the big boys are too powerful to be too obvious about much of anything.
I do acknowledge the general truth, however that the "you-can't-fire-them" class of lower-level government employees have an especially strong incentive toward stupidity, laziness, incompetence, and -- worst of all -- contempt for the American citizen. (Noble exceptions to this abound, of course, but I'm speaking of the bureaucracy as a whole ...)
The larger world is so hopeless and helpless that I stopped watching television and listening to radio years ago. For the most part, when I hear of something big happening, it's only by accident, and I've got to say, life has been better this way. Try it for a few weeks or months and then go back to commercial media just to remind yourself what it was like. Never will I go back to the circus.
Thanks for the lengthy and considered response to what on reflection is all over the place indeed. The result of not thinking things through, I guess. In my defence I am not making an ideological point about the current administration, merely pointing to the disruptive and destructive nature of its policy posture re NATO: perhaps it's all for the best, Europe must awaken, and Trump's egregious style has jolted NATO into seeing that. I appreciate your points and see the awful truth of overwhelming military power. But only in the hands of those with restraint at the heart of their engagement with others. I'm properly concerned at the appointment of Hegseth as Secretary of Defense but my opinion matters not a jot. You draw the correct conclusions about Gulf War I and failed attempts at overreach in other places. I am embarrassed to see that my note was indeed not thought through but rather portentously written - unlike your own original post and your reply to mine.
I've been thinking about this piece for the last 24 hours and have another question for you. How do we fight guerrillas such we encountered in Afghanistan? In all my reading of military encounters local guerrilla fighters are the hardest enemy to defeat. They know the area and terrain, they swoop in for a sudden attack and vanish. Russia learned this in Afghanistan and the US wasn't smart enough in my opinion to learn from their mistakes. Short of dropping a nuke and obliterating everything how do we deal with this successfully? The Houthis seem to have the possibility of being Afghanistan 2.0.
First, let me say my forte is policy analysis, not military strategy. I'm not the strategy guy in the room (when I was in the room), but I’ve worked on military field manuals, OPLANS, etc., so it’s not like I don’t understand this. Based on what we’ve seen work, the best approach would be “denial of oxygen.”
The Houthis don’t just survive on firepower; they need a steady flow of resources, legitimacy, and external support to keep fighting. Instead of trying to root them out with an occupation or large-scale bombing campaign, the smarter play is to suffocate them strategically—cutting off their ability to sustain prolonged conflict without giving them the propaganda win of looking like the underdog against U.S. firepower. It’s not easy, but that’s the recommendation I’d make. It’s also what I imagine a competent Joint Staff would propose. With Dan Cain as Chairman and the DUI Hire in place, I suspect the actual strategy will involve dropping MAGA hats on Yemen and calling it a day, or alternatively, indiscriminate carpet bombing. Both would fail.
The Houthis rely on Iranian weapons, tech, and intelligence. Rather than direct confrontation, the goal should be to disrupt that pipeline. Interdict arms shipments, hit logistics hubs, and increase the cost of Iranian support. If sustaining the Houthis becomes too expensive or logistically difficult, Tehran has to reconsider how much it’s worth. Guerrilla movements don’t just win battles—they win narratives. Right now, they position themselves as the resistance against Saudi and U.S. intervention, which keeps them politically viable. Undermining that means exploiting their governance failures, amplifying internal divisions, and avoiding broad strikes that turn civilian casualties into recruitment tools.
I would think that the successful military approach would focus on surgical strikes over broad campaigns. Again, this is what we did during ISIS. We weren't rolling out the B2s and carpet bombing, we hit where it hurt most and disrupted supplies and recruiting capability. Mass bombing doesn’t eliminate insurgencies—it reinforces them. The priority should be decapitation strikes on leadership, electronic and cyber disruptions to limit their coordination, and selective infrastructure targeting to disrupt warfighting capabilities. The goal isn’t wiping them out overnight—it’s making their position untenable over time. Cut off their supply lines, force them into a defensive posture, and make continued fighting too costly. Eventually Iran has to decide if it wants to cut and run or bleed out. Most of the time, they're going to choose cut and run. That leaves the Houthis to decide if they want to remain a cogent organization or cease to exist. I'm guessing suicide isn't their top priority.
This is the same kind of long-term containment strategy that eventually worked against ISIS. ISIS was not outright eliminated, but we degraded it into an incoherent force that could project power. Overwhelming force doesn’t defeat these groups; it degrades them, forces them into smaller, ineffective operations, and allows them to erode or be dismantled piece by piece. The difference here is that the Houthis have state backing, which makes it a tougher problem, but the principle remains the same. One additional pressure point is Iran itself—if they’re forced to divert resources elsewhere, it makes supporting the Houthis harder. Disrupting Iranian infrastructure, cyber capabilities, and economic stability in targeted ways would add pressure, forcing them to reconsider the cost of proxy warfare.
The mistake would be going all-in and escalating into a broader war. The more the U.S. leans into conventional force, the more the Houthis gain politically by playing the underdog. The right move is sustained strategic pressure in ways they can’t easily counter—strangling their ability to function rather than charging into the kind of fight they want.
Again, I'm not the J5... but that's my eyeballed plan. I imagine it's the right one given what I know about how to defeat insurgencies and proxy organizations.
Thanks for the insight. What you've outlined makes perfect sense.
Powerful and forceful writing, if confusing in its boastfulness. Cometh the man (Trump), cometh the retribution - but against the US, because of HIS boastfulness. You haven't drawn the correct conclusions from Vietnam onwards. Gulf War I looks anomalous today, the result misleading you into self-reliant complacency when the proper reading should have valued the allied coalition. This is what happens when an unserious electorate delivers the reins of government up to Reality TV showmen. At best, your former allies are wakening to your threat and taking steps to block you. At worst, the constellation of evil actors now includes the US. God help us all.
I’ll be honest—I’m not sure I understand what you’re arguing because your comment is all over the place. If your point is that the U.S. has become reckless in its use of military force, that’s one discussion. If it’s that the U.S. is overestimating its power and ignoring the role of allies, that’s another. If it’s that Trump’s foreign policy posturing is coming back to bite us, that’s yet another. Right now, you seem to be blending all of them without a clear throughline.
This wasn’t about boastfulness or blind faith in American power—it was about practical containment strategies that avoid deeper entanglements. The goal isn’t to wage endless wars or act unilaterally, it’s to prevent conflicts from escalating into exactly the kind of quagmires you’re warning about. Gulf War I wasn’t an anomaly because of the coalition—it was successful because it had clear objectives, overwhelming force, and a limited scope. The problem in later wars wasn’t that we lacked allies, it was that we overestimated our ability to nation-build after military victories. That’s not a lesson that invalidates U.S. power projection—it’s a lesson about what comes after military success.
If your concern is that U.S. allies are adjusting to a world where they trust Washington less, that’s a fair discussion. But if your argument is that the U.S. has now become one of the “evil actors,” that’s an entirely different debate—one that’s more about ideology than strategy. If anything, the greater risk isn’t American overreach, it’s American disengagement. As flawed as U.S. foreign policy has been, a world without a strong deterrent to hostile actors isn’t a world that gets more stable.
That would be an adversaries choice of resistance, I think. We don't seem to respond as well. See Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.
What concerns me now is Iran quietly finding ways to get a few nukes. I don't think they'd hold back of their existence was threatened. Can you imagine the shock and response if they got lucky and hit a carrier group? Unlikely, yes. But warfare is full of unlikely events.
It’s true that the U.S. has struggled against asymmetric resistance in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam—but that’s not because we’re incapable of winning those wars. It’s because we don’t fight total wars anymore.
The response would look very different against a near-peer adversary. The U.S. doesn’t lose conventional fights—we lose when we fight with political constraints and try to wage war while pretending it’s a humanitarian mission. If the gloves come off, and the mission is destruction rather than occupation, the outcome changes fast.
As for Iran, quietly obtaining nukes is always a concern. But let’s be realistic—if they get a small arsenal, they don’t use it unless they face total annihilation. Iran’s leadership isn’t suicidal; they’re strategic. They want nuclear weapons for deterrence, not first strikes.
Could they get lucky and hit a carrier group? It's unlikely, but yes—warfare is full of improbable events. That’s why we overwhelm threats before they become problems. But if Iran ever nuked a carrier group? Their country ceases to exist within the hour. And they know it.
So, while it’s worth watching, it’s not the most immediate concern. The bigger issue isn’t Iran using a nuke—it’s how their nuclear capability changes the regional power balance and emboldens them to take enormous risks elsewhere.
Thoughts?
Hypothetical question: Would we want to wage total war against Canada? Why?
As far as Iran goes, if we went all out against them, would they accept being destroyed without total retaliation? They're religious fanatics, after all.
A total war against Canada is an absurd hypothetical precisely because Canada poses no existential threat to the United States. The Houthis, for all their hostility, are not an existential threat either—they're a regional insurgency with drones and missiles, not a peer adversary.
As for Iran, "going all out" assumes they wouldn't respond in kind. Iran has spent decades building asymmetric capabilities—proxy networks, cyber warfare, and regional influence—to ensure that any attack on them comes at a steep cost. The assumption that religious fanaticism means suicidal self-destruction ignores Iran’s long history of calculated, strategic decision-making. They might retaliate in ways that make an all-out war far costlier than anyone expects.
In the end, however, they still lose. They can't make it so costly that the US decides not to end them if the decision is made to "end them."
You may be 100% correct about Iran being religious fanatics, but I think it wouldn't hurt if we tried to double-check that assumption. Many nations, including ours, create and spread subtle propaganda on such a regular and ongoing basis that we can't tell it apart from real truth.
The few Persians I've known were highly intelligent, competent, and civilized people who cared about their families just like we do, and other than those few, I've never met any actual inhabitants of the country of Iran or seen what life is like over there -- other than the claims made by the same media that has lied to the world on myriad other topics.
There is also that special category of falsehood called atrocity propaganda, one of whose most common claims has been that the enemy "is killing babies." Remember the baby incubators lie which was sold to Congress using the actual tears of a real "eyewitness"? Remember an old wartime poster circa WWI that showed a monstrous German Hun eating a baby? Etc.
I'm suggesting, in effect, that we run surprise inspections of the statements made by media and government to make sure they're not exploiting our trust to justify wars whose real goals are turf, oil, money, drugs, or favors for scary friends.
Yes I remember all of that... the incubator story... etc. Weepy Kuwatiis.
I also remember George Tenant and Colin Powell talking about chemical weapons trucks. Intelligence is not fact.
Sure, skepticism about media narratives is healthy, but at the end of the day, it doesn’t change the outcome. Iran can build proxy networks, run cyber ops, and play the long game all they want—but spin the wheel, go to war, and get crushed. It doesn’t matter how many brilliant Persians exist or how strategic their leadership is. If they take on the U.S. in a full-scale fight, they lose. They operate the real way they do because they know this. That’s why they rely on asymmetric tactics, regional influence, and economic leverage instead of picking a direct fight.
It’s not about propaganda—it’s about reality. The reality is, they get their asses handed to them faster than a sandwich from Jimmy Johns.